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Military Conscription and University Enrolment: 
Evidence from Italy 
 
Given that a growing number of countries have abolished or are considering the abolition of 
military conscription, understanding the consequences of this measure is of increased 
importance. In this paper we study the effect of the suppression of compulsory military 
service on university enrolment in Italy using double and triple differences models. The 
empirical results show that there is no compelling evidence suggesting that the abolition of 
military conscription has a causal effect on university enrolment. However, although there is 
no significant overall effect, we find some evidence of heterogeneous effects. While this 
measure seems to increase university participation among individuals from more advantaged 
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 1. Introduction  
 
A number of studies in the economics literature look at the effects of military 
conscription. While some of them (Angrist and Krueger, 1989; Angrist, 1990; Imbens 
and Wilbert van der Klaauw, 1995; Bauer et al., 2004) analyse the impact of serving 
in the military on individuals’ subsequent earnings, others focus on the consequences 
of the suppression of compulsory military service (CMS) on schooling. These latter 
studies produce, however, mixed results. 
 
Maurin and Xenogiani (2007) conclude that French young men who were affected by 
the 1997 military reform, which abolished CMS, have a lower educational attainment 
and a lower probability of successfully completing high school relative to their peers 
who were not at risk of service. This reform is found to have a detrimental effect 
especially on the educational outcomes of individuals from less advantaged socio-
economic backgrounds. Results from studies by Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Card 
and Lemieux (2001) can also be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that the 
abolition of CMS may have an adverse effect on schooling. They find that in the US 
between 1965 and 1975 draft avoidance behaviours led to a rise in college enrolment 
and graduation rates, implicitly suggesting that these would have been lower in the 
absence of conscription.  
 
On the other hand, findings from studies on the UK and Italy are at variance with 
those reported above. Buonanno (2006) shows that in the UK the abolition of military 
conscription has led to an increase in school attendance among men aged 18 or above. 
Additionally, his estimates indicate that individuals for whom the military service was 
not compulsory have, on average, 0.25 years of education more than those who were 
subject to CMS. Cipollone and Rosolia (2007) look at the consequences of exemption 
from CMS given to a few cohorts of men living in areas of southern Italy that were hit 
by an earthquake in 1980. They find that this exemption led to a 2 percentage points 
increase in male high school graduation rates.  
 
In light of these mixed results, in this paper we attempt to provide new evidence on 
the relationship between education and the suppression of CMS. We extend earlier 
work of Cipollone and Rosolia (2007) on Italy in three main respects. First, while 
  3their analysis regards some parts of Italy, we look at the effects of the abolition of 
National Service in all the Italian territory. Second, our study uses very recent data as 
CMS was abolished in Italy in 2005. Third, whilst Cipollone and Rosolia (2007) 
examine how not being at risk of service has affected the choice to finish high school, 
we analyse the effect of the abolition of CMS on the university enrolment decision. 
Understanding the factors influencing the transition from secondary to tertiary 
education is very important given that there are relevant benefits associated with 
investment in higher education not only for individuals but also for society as a whole 
(Baum and Payea, 2004).  
 
The abolition of military conscription may have conflicting effects on the decision to 
pursue education and in particular on that of enrolling at university. On the one hand, 
it may discourage male high school graduates from further investing in schooling 
since they no longer need to stay in education as a way to avoid immediate military 
service. As outlined by Maurin and Xenogiani (2007), many young men choose to 
defer the military service as long as they can, since this experience is perceived to be 
associated with several costs (e.g. living in a barrack, sharing a room with several 
other men and participating in military training and drills). Additionally, holding a 
university degree may significantly reduce these costs as university graduates are 
likely to be chosen for milder forms of national service.  
 
On the other hand, however, the dismissal of CMS may induce more male high school 
graduates to invest in university education as this allows them to get returns from this 
investment over a longer period. Additionally, although male university and high 
school graduates may both benefit from the abolition of CMS as they can both enter 
into the labour market immediately after completing their studies, avoiding career 
interruptions is likely to bring more advantages to the former group relative to the 
latter
1. This is because the rate of depreciation of education is likely to increase with 
years of education (Neuman and Weiss, 1995) given that more educated individuals 
typically have jobs where technical and economic changes happen at a fast rate.  
 
                                                 
1 The career interruption may last longer than the length of the military service as typically, due to 
bureaucratic reasons, there is a waiting period before men can actually start the service. Imbens and 
Wilbert van der Klaauw (1995) suggest that in the Netherlands the cost of doing the military service is 
approximately equivalent to the cost of losing two years of potential work experience.  
  4The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we develop a simple model to 
investigate the effect of the abolition of CMS on the university enrolment decision. 
Section 3 briefly describes the institutional features of CMS in Italy before it was 
abolished. In Section 4 we outline the identification strategy used to determine the 
causal effect of the suppression of CMS on university enrolment. Section 5 presents 
the data employed in this study. In Section 6 empirical results are reported and 
discussed. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. A simple theoretical framework 
 
Unlike previous studies on the effect of the abolition of CMS on education, in this 
paper we set up a simple theoretical framework in order to understand how not having 
to do the military service may influence the schooling decision of young male 
individuals. We adopt a human capital approach (Becker, 1964) and, given the 
purpose of this study, we focus our attention on the decision whether or not to enrol at 
university. Let’s first analyse this choice in the presence of CMS. In such a case, the 
present value of the earnings stream for a male high school graduate who, at the age 
















where the superscript HS refers to high school education, r is the discount rate and W 
is the yearly wage. Assuming that the military service lasts for one year, this 
individual is expected to earn W
HS from age 19 until the age of retirement (i.e. 65).  
 
If instead, the male high school graduate chooses to enrol at university, then the 
















where the superscript U refers to university education. Assuming that this individual 
is able to graduate in four years and that the military service still lasts for one year, he 
is expected to earn W
U from age 24 until retirement.  
 
  5Now we look at what happens when CMS is abolished. In this circumstance, the 
present value of the earnings stream for a male high school graduate who, at the age 
















If instead, after the suppression of CMS, the male high school graduate chooses to 

















As one can see from Equations (3) and (4), the abolition of CMS brings financial 
benefits for the individual if he decides not to attend university as well as if he 
chooses to enrol at university.  
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 is the gain from having a higher wage afterwards. 
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 represents the opportunity cost of going to university 
                                                 
2 It is assumed that the direct cost of university education is zero. 











is the gain from having a higher wage afterwards. 
 
This simple model shows that the of abolition of CMS encourages a male high school 
graduate to enrol at university if the left hand side of Equation (6) is bigger than the 


















































































The condition (7) can be re-written as: 
 
(8)   
HS U W r W
5 ) 1 ( + >
 
From Equation (8) it emerges that the suppression of CMS will have a positive impact 
on the university enrolment decision if 
1)  the individual time discount rate is small enough 
2)  the university wage is large enough relative to the high school wage 
 
 
3. Compulsory military service in Italy 
 
In Italy CMS was abolished in 2005 following a military reform (Legge Martino) 
approved by the Parliament in July 2004. According to this reform, men born after 1
st 
January 1986 are no longer subject to CMS
3. The rationale for this was to move 
toward a professional military in line with several other countries including the US 
and the UK.  
 
In Italy the procedures for the selection of conscripts were similar to those 
implemented in other countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. All young men 
were called for medical and psychological examinations shortly after or shortly before 
they turned 18. These examinations typically lasted between 2 and 3 days, at the end 
                                                 
3 Whilst in the early 1980s the length of service was 12 months, in the late 1990s this was reduced to 
10 months. 
  7of which period potential recruits were split into three main groups: a) those who had 
a good health status and no psychological problems were declared to be suitable to do 
the military service; b) those who had serious health or physiological problems were 
immediately exempt from the military service; c) those who needed to undertake 
further medical and psychological examinations. Based on the results of these 
additional examinations, they were declared to be fit to serve or not. Finally, even if 
on the grounds of medical and psychological examinations a young man was found to 
be suitable to do the military service, he could still have been exempt for special 
reasons
4. As outlined by Cipollone and Rosolia (2007), in Italy “the reasons for 
exemption from service were strictly coded and restrictive”. 
 
Men who at the age of 18 were in school could defer military service, provided that 
they could successfully complete high school by the age of 22. Male high school 
graduates who enrolled at university immediately after completing their studies could 
also obtain one-year deferment. Those students performing well at university could 
obtain successive one-year deferments, provided that they could graduate by the age 
of 27. 
 
The 2004 military reform also put an end to conscientious objectors. Since 1972, men, 
who were declared to be fit to serve in the military, had the possibility to become 
conscientious objectors. Conscientious objectors were freed from military service but 
they had to perform public service for a period of time typically longer than that 
associated with the military service. On the other hand, they enjoyed considerable 
freedom in selecting the institution where to the perform public service.  
 
4. Identification strategy 
 
In this Section we sketch the methodological approach used to estimate the effect of 
the abolition of CMS on university enrolment. Gender and the date of birth jointly 
determine whether a high school graduate is affected by the abolition of CMS. 
Women are exempt from military service in Italy. Only those male high school 
graduates born after 1
st January 1986 benefit from the suppression of CMS. Hence, to 
estimate the effect of the abolition of CMS on the decision to attend university, our 
                                                 
4 For instance, if he was orphan from both parents, son or brother of a soldier died in war or widower 
with dependant child 
  8basic strategy is to track the difference in university enrolment between male high 
school graduates born after and before 1
st January 1986, and then compare this with 
the corresponding difference between similar female high school graduates. This 
comparison, which generates the so-called difference-in-differences (DiD) or double-
difference estimator, allows us to control for unobserved age-group specific effects as 
well as for common macro-effects. Using a sample of high school graduates who 
successfully completed their studies in 2004, one may observe that those born after 1
st 
January 1986 were 18 years old or less at that time.  Thus our DiD estimator is: 
 
(9)    ) ( ) (
19 18 19 18 2
2004
≥ ≤ ≥ ≤ − − − = ∆ F F M M E E E E
 
where subscripts M and F denote males and females, respectively. Whilst 
18 ≤ E  
represents the university enrolment choice of individuals aged 18 or less when they 
finished high school, 
19 ≥ E indicates the university enrolment choice of individuals 
aged 19 or more when they finished high school. The subscript 2004 indicates that we 
use a sample of people who finished high school in 2004.  
 
Adjusting the DiD estimator for observables requires estimating the following 
equation:  
 
(10)   i i i i i i i M T T M X E ε β β β β α + + + + + = 3 2 1 0      
where Ei is the university enrolment choice observed for high school graduate i. It is a 
dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the high school graduate enrols at university, 
and 0 otherwise. X is a vector of individual and family characteristics that are thought 
to influence the university enrolment decision. M is a dummy taking the value 1 if the 
high school graduate is male, and 0 otherwise. T is a dummy variable taking the value 
1 if the individual finished high school when he/she was 18 years old or younger, and 
0 otherwise; and ε  is the usual error term.  
 
The DiD estimator is the coefficient 3 β . It tests whether, following the abolition of 
CMS, the difference in university enrolment between high school graduates aged 18 
or less and their peers aged 19 or above varies systematically across gender. 3 β  
identifies the true effect of the suppression of CMS assuming there are no shocks 
  9taking place coincidentally at the same as the 2004 military reform and affecting only 
the university enrolment decision of male high school graduates aged 18 or less. 
 
Our DiD estimator would be biased if the change in university enrolment between 
high school graduates aged 18 or less and their peers aged 19 or above systematically 
evolves differently across males and females. One way of testing this assumption is to 
carry out a pre-program test using a sample of individuals who finished high school in 
the years preceding the abolition of CMS. More precisely, using a sample of high 
school graduates who successfully completed their studies in 2001, the following DiD 
estimator can be computed: 
 
(11)    ) ( ) (
19 18 19 18 2
2001
≥ ≤ ≥ ≤ − − − = ∆ F F M M E E E E
 
An adjusted double-difference for the 2001 sample of high school graduates can be 
computed by estimating an equation analogous to Equation (10). If in this equation 
the estimated DiD coefficient turns out not to be statistically significant, such a result 
would support the hypothesis that  3 β  in Equation (10) identifies the causal effect of 
the abolition of CMS on university enrolment. If, however, in the 2001 sample the 
difference in university enrolment between high school graduates aged 18 or less and 
their peers age 19 or above is found to be higher among males than among females, 
then the DiD estimator in Equation (10) is likely to overstate the true effect of the 
abolition of CMS on university enrolment. Finally, a negative and statistically 
significant value of the adjusted double-difference estimator for the 2001 sample 
implies that the DiD coefficient in Equation (10) is likely to understate the true effect 
of the abolition of CMS on university enrolment. 
 
By pooling the 2001 and 2004 samples of high school graduates it is possible to 
obtain a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DiDiD) or triple-difference estimator 
following the approach of Hamermesh and Trejo (2000) and Bansak and Rapahel 
(2001). We subtract the DiD estimator for the 2004 sample from the comparable DiD 
estimator for the 2001 sample. 





3 ∆ − ∆ = ∆
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To compute the DiDiD estimator within a regression framework, the following 
regression is estimated: 
 
(13)
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i T M D T D M D TM D T M X E ε β β β β β β β β α + + + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  
where  Di is dummy variable taking the value 1 if the high school graduate 
successfully completed his/her studies in 2004, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient 7 β  
represents the triple-difference estimator. It measures the extent to which in the 2004 
sample the university enrolment gap between our two age-groups of male high school 
graduates, relative to the university enrolment gap between the two similar female 
groups, is statistically different from the comparable difference-in-differences in the 
2001 sample. If the adjusted double-difference for the 2001 sample is equal to zero, 
then the triple difference estimator will reduce to the double-difference in Equation 
(10).  
 
Our estimation strategy on the effect of the abolition of CMS on university enrolment 
is accompanied by one drawback which is common to the large majority of studies on 
the costs/benefits of military service. We assume that all male high school graduates 
born before 1
st January 1986 are subject to CMS. This is obviously not true because 
one would expect some of them to have been exempt for the reasons outlined in 
footnote 4. Such an issue, however, is unlikely to bias our estimates as long as the 
reasons behind the exemption, though possibly correlated with the university 
enrolment decision, are randomly distributed across males and females aged 18 or less 
when they finished high school.  
 
Equations (10) and (13) can be estimated by OLS as this allows us to directly estimate 
the parameter of interest
5. As pointed out by Angrist (2001), the problem of causal 
inference does not significantly differ between limited dependent variables and 
continuous outcomes. This means that if there are no covariates or the covariates are 
sparse and discrete, then linear models can be used to estimate models with limited 
                                                 
5 As shown by Chunrong and Norton (2003), while in linear models the interpretation of the coefficient of the 
interaction between two variables is straightforward, this does not hold in non-linear models.  
  11dependent variables as well as models with other types of dependent variables. 
Berlinski and Galiani (2007) argue that institutional reform and policy experiments 
clearly fall within this framework since control variables are primarily added in an 
attempt to improve the efficiency of the estimates, but their omission is unlikely to 
significantly bias the estimates of the parameter of interest. Borjas (2003, 2004) uses 





The data for this study are taken from two waves (i.e. 2004 and 2007) of a national 
cross-sectional survey (Percorsi di Studio e di Lavoro dei Diplomati) carried out by 
the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT). Each wave consists of a 
representative sample of high school graduates who are surveyed three years after 
completing their studies. Thus these data enable us to examine the post-high school 
decisions made by two cohorts of individuals who completed their studies in 2001
6 
and 2004. Although one of the possible destinations of these individuals is university 
enrolment, there are other possible trajectories. Some people may start to work 
immediately while others may become job seekers, and they can all change their mind 
after the initial choice. The survey contains individual information on previous 
educational attainment, parents’ socio-economic status as well as a range of personal 
attributes.  
 
In Italy all high school graduates gain the automatic right of entry to university, 
provided that they have successfully completed five years in high school
7. The 
underlying idea behind this provision is to give to each high school graduate the 
opportunity of experimenting to see whether he/she is university material (Manski, 
1989). 
 
Our empirical analysis considers four different sets of characteristics that are likely to 
affect the decision to enrol at university. The first group consists of three proxies for 
the individual’s academic ability. These indicators are: lower secondary school 
                                                 
6 Earlier cohorts of high school graduates cannot be considered for the purpose of this study given that in 2001 the 
Italian university system embarked on a process of reform which led to the introduction of the “3+2” model (for 
more details about this reform see Bratti et al., 2006) 
7 There are no admission standards, except for specialized disciplines such as medicine and architecture.  
  12(scuola media) final grade, high school final grade and a dummy variable recording 
whether the individual has failed and had to repeat at least one year at high school. 
The second set of factors includes school-related variables. We include indicators for 
the type of high school attended by the individual and a dummy variable recording 
whether this high school was public or private. The third group of variables comprises 
individual personal attributes such as gender, age and area of residence
8. Finally, we 
include family background characteristics such as parents’ highest educational 
attainment and father’s occupation
9.  
 
Following the approach of Cappellari (2004) and Di Pietro and Cutillo (2008), we 
eliminate from the final sample those individuals who graduated from those high 
schools mainly designed to train primary school teachers (scuole magistrali). These 
schools have a different structure relative to the other types of high schools. 
Additionally, we exclude from the final sample high school graduates living abroad 
and those who, though they enrolled at university, did not do so immediately after 
completing their studies. After deleting observations with missing variables of 
interest, we are left with 20,846 and 16,959 high school graduates in the 2004 and 
2001 samples, respectively.  
 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study. 
Although in Italy the large majority of people successfully complete high school at 
the age of 19 or above, some manage to do it at the age of 18 (or less in very 
exceptional cases). These are individuals who, at the age of 5, attended a special 
course (primina), upon successful completion of which they were allowed to skip the 
first year of primary school. This means that at the age of 6, when most children begin 
primary school, they were admitted to the second year of primary school
10.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                 
8 Four geographical areas are considered: North-East, North-West, South and Centre. Unfortunately, we are unable 
to define areas of residence at a more disaggregated level (i.e. region) given that this information is unavailable. 
The inclusion of dummies for area of residence allows us to control for labour market conditions across the 
geographical areas. 
9 Given the low direct cost of university education in Italy (compared to other countries such as, for instance, the 
US), tuition fees are unlikely to exert an influence on the enrolment decision even for individuals from less 
advantaged backgrounds. Previous studies (see for, instance, Di Pietro and Cutillo, 2006) on the determinants of 
university enrolment in Italy have not considered the impact of this factor. 
10 Typically parents can freely decide to make their child attend primina. The child has the right to 
enrol on the second year of primary school as long as he/she passes a final exam.  
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From Table 1 it emerges that in both the 2001 and 2004 samples university enrolment 
rate is significantly higher among individuals who finished high school at the age of 
18 or less relative to their older peers. For instance, in the 2004 sample the proportion 
of people who enrolled at university immediately after successfully completing high 
school is 80% among the former group, compared to 57% among latter group. This is 
also due to the fact that people who finished high school at the age of 18 or less 
typically show higher academic ability and are more likely to come from a more 
privileged family background than their older peers. This finding is in line with our 
expectations given that well-educated parents have high educational expectations for 
their children and hence they may want them to start school earlier.  
 
6. Empirical results 
 
The results reported in the first half of Table 2 present the double-difference estimates 
for the 2004 sample, which emerge from a very basic university enrolment 
specification. The DiD coefficient is statistically significant at all conventional levels 
and has a positive sign. Our empirical results show that after the abolition of CMS the 
change in the probability of enrolling at university between our two age-groups of 
high school graduates was 15 percentage points higher across males relative to 
females. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
A number of personal, family background and school-related characteristics are added 
to our basic university enrolment equation. The result for this new specification is 
depicted in the second half of Table 2. The empirical findings are generally consistent 
with previous research. Attending a general high school (liceo), performing well at 
high school, not repeating a high school year, being female, studying at a public high 
school
11, having well-educated parents all result in a higher probability of enrolling at 
university. Moving to the variable of primary interest in this study, one may note that 
the DiD coefficient is still statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Nevertheless, 
its value is smaller than the corresponding one in the first half of Table 2. More 
precisely, our results imply that controlling for observable individual characteristics 
                                                 
11 Several studies (see, for instance, Bertola and Checchi, 2002) suggest that in Italy private schools 
play a remedial role. They tend to attract less talented students from wealthy backgrounds.  
  14removes approximately one-third of the estimated difference-in-differences shown in 
the first half of Table 2.  
 
To test whether the results depicted in Table 2 are robust, we check the sensitivity of 
our estimates to our definition of university enrolment. Hence we include in the final 
sample those high school graduates who enrolled at university, but instead of doing it 
immediately after finishing their studies, they did it two or three years later. The 
increase in sample size is, however, quite modest given that in Italy the majority of 
high school graduates enrol at university straight after completing their studies. 
Estimates based on this larger sample are depicted in Table 3. Not only in both model 
specifications the DiD coefficients are still positive and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level, but also their values are relatively close to the corresponding values of 
the DiD coefficients depicted in Table 2. In light of these results, it is possible to 
conclude that our estimates are not sensitive to changes in the definition of university 
enrolment 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Our DiD estimates seem to suggest that the abolition of CMS is actually driving the 
higher university enrolment growth experienced by male high school graduates aged 
18 or less compared to their peers aged 19 or above, relative to the growth in 
university enrolment between similar female groups. This finding, however, relies on 
the identification assumption according to which in the absence of the abolition of 
CMS the increase in university enrolment of the high school graduates aged 18 or less 
relative to their older peers would have been the same across males and females. In 
order to test this hypothesis, two different tests are carried out. First, following the 
approach of Duflo (2001), we perform a control experiment. An implication of the 
identification assumption is that, since in 2004 males who successfully completed 
high school at the age of 19 or above were not affected by the military reform, the 
increase in university enrolment between two cohorts in this age-group should not be 
systematically different across males and females. Hence we restrict our 2004 sample 
to those individuals who successfully completed high school at the age of 19 or above 
and then we split them in two cohorts: a cohort of individuals who finished high 
school at the age of 19 and a cohort of individuals who were older than 19 years when 
  15they finished high school. To compute the new difference-in-differences, we estimate 
the following equation: 
 
(14)   i i i i i i i M K K M X E ε β β β β α + + + + + = 9 8 1 0      
where K is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual finished high school 
when he/she was 19 years old, and 0 otherwise 
 
The estimates from the less parsimonious specification, which are depicted in the 
second half of Table 4, suggest that assigning a causal interpretation to the DiD 
coefficient shown in the second half of Table 2 is suspect: also the change in the 
probability of enrolling at university enrolment between high school graduates aged 
19 and their peers older than 19 years is higher across males than across females after 
the abolition of CMS. 
 
  Insert Table 4 about here 
 
A more convincing test for the validity of the identification assumption is represented 
by a pre-program test. The idea is to check whether in the years preceding the 
implementation of the military reform the university enrolment gap between our two 
age-groups of high school graduates already exhibited a different trend across males 
and females. Hence we perform a pre-program test using a sample of people who 
finished high school in 2001. The estimates reported in Table 5 suggest that in the 
period before the abolition of CMS the trend in relative high school graduates aged 18 
or less/ high school graduates aged 19 or above university enrolment was already 
different across males and females. During such a period this trend was flatter across 
females relative to males. More specifically, in the less parsimonious specification the 
difference in the probability of enrolling at university between our two age-groups of 
high school graduates was 5.4 percentage points higher across males than across 
females. This finding confirms the inappropriateness of our DiD identification 
assumption. In light of the evidence reported in Table 5, the DiD estimates depicted in 
Table 2 are likely to overestimate the effect of the suppression of CMS on university 
enrolment.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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differential university enrolment trend between our two age-groups across males and 
females in the years preceding the implementation of the military reform. As outlined 
in Section 4, one way to account for this differential trend is to employ the triple-
difference model. This model attempts to subtract the bias revealed through the pre-
program test from the effect of the abolition of CMS estimated using the DiD model. 
Specifically, it tests whether in the 2004 sample the growth in university enrolment 
shown by male high school graduates aged 18 or less compared to their peers aged 19 
or above, relative to the comparable growth between similar female groups, is 
statistically different from the corresponding difference-in-differences in the 2001 
sample. These triple-difference estimates are reported in Table 6. Whilst in our very 
basic specification the DiDiD coefficient has a positive sign and is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level, in the full control specification it retains the positive 
sign but loses its statistical significance. Consequently, there appears to be no 
compelling evidence indicating that in the 2004 sample the gender difference in the 
probability of enrolling at university between high school graduates aged 18 or less 
and their older peers has actually been driven by the abolition of CMS. Our results 
suggest that, not only this gender difference already existed before the abolition of 
CMS, but also that the difference between these two differences is not statistically 
significant.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
 
Although the DiDiD estimates reported in Table 6 show that the abolition of CMS has 
no significant overall effect on university enrolment, it is still possible that the effect 
differs across individuals with different characteristics. As outlined in the theoretical 
framework set up in Section 2, holding wages for university and high school 
graduates constant, the suppression of CMS may encourage university participation 
among individuals with lower discount rates, but at the same time it may discourage 
university participation among those with higher discount rates. In the returns to 
education literature it is generally assumed (see, for instance, Card, 1994) that people 
from more advantaged family backgrounds (i.e. higher-income people) tend to have 
lower discount rates than those from less advantaged family backgrounds. Hence, to 
test whether the 2004 military reform is associated with any heterogeneous effects, we 
  17estimate our triple-difference model for individuals from more and less advantaged 
family backgrounds, separately. Father’s occupation is used as a proxy for family 
background. While the first half of Table 7 reports the DiDiD estimates for 
individuals whose father has either a high-level occupation or a medium-level 
occupation, the second half of Table 7 presents the corresponding estimates for those 
whose father has either a low-level occupation or other/unknown occupations
12.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Table 7 shows some evidence of heterogeneous effects. While in the first half of 
Table 7 the DiDiD coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level and has 
a positive sign, in the second half of Table 7 the corresponding coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level but has a negative sign. Thus these 
results would seem to support the hypothesis that, while the abolition of CMS 
increased university participation among individuals from more privileged family 
backgrounds, it had a negative impact on the enrolment of those from less privileged 
family backgrounds. Although male individuals with higher discount rates choose 
lower levels of education, the presence of CMS, because of its associated costs, could 
have diverted them towards a longer investment in schooling. On the other hand, the 
longer payoff period associated with investment in university education, which is 
triggered by the abolition of CMS, could encourage male high school graduates with  





Given that several countries throughout the world have already abolished or are 
considering the abolition of CMS, understanding the consequences of this measure is 
of increased concern. In this paper we have attempted to analyse the effect of the 
suppression of CMS on the decision to enrol at university among Italian male high 
school graduates. Studying the factors influencing the transition from secondary to 
tertiary education is very important as investing in higher education is expected to 
bring significant benefits not only to individuals but also to society as a whole. 
                                                 
12 The inclusion of geographical area dummies in the specification allows us to control for differences 
in the wage differential between university and high school graduates living in the same area.  
  18The abolition of CMS may have conflicting effects on the university enrolment 
decision of male high school graduates. On the one hand, it may discourage them 
from attending university as they no longer need to continue studying in order to 
avoid military service. This argument hinges on the idea that young men typically 
perceive the military service to be associated with several costs and hence they want 
to postpone it as long as they can. On the other hand, however, high school graduates 
may be more willing to invest in university education as the dismissal of CMS implies 
a longer payoff period for this investment.  
 
In Italy in 2004 those male individuals who successfully completed high school at the 
age of 18 or less were not at risk of service. Our identification strategy is to compare 
their university enrolment decision with that of their older peers, relative to the 
corresponding difference between similar female groups. This approach allows us to 
account for unobserved age-group specific effects and common macro-effects in 
addition to observable characteristics. Double-difference estimates show that the 
difference in university enrolment between these two age-groups of high school 
graduates is higher across males relative to females. However, a pre-program test 
reveals that in the years preceding the abolition of CMS the university enrolment gap 
between high school graduates aged 18 or less and their older peers was already 
higher across males than across females. In light of this result, we compare the gender 
difference in university enrolment between these two groups during the period after 
the abolition of CMS with the corresponding one during the period before the 
abolition of CMS. As the difference between these two differences is not statistically 
different from zero, our estimates suggest that the abolition of CMS had no 
statistically significant effect on university participation rate.  
 
Although the triple-difference estimates suggest that the abolition of CMS has no 
significant overall effect on university enrolment, we find some evidence of 
heterogeneous effects. While this measure seems to increase university participation 
among individuals from more advantaged backgrounds, it appears to have a 
detrimental effect on the enrolment of those from less advantaged backgrounds. These 
findings may have considerable policy implications. Given that Italy is characterised 
by great inequality in access to university education (Di Pietro, 2008), there is the risk 
that the abolition of CMS may further exacerbate this situation.  
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  21Table 1. Mean and standard deviation (in brackets) of variables 
  2004 high school graduates  2001 high school graduates 
  Aged 18 or 
less 
Aged 19 or more  Aged 18 or 
less 
Aged 19 or more 
Enrolled at university=1, otherwise= 0  0.80 (0.40)  0.57 (0.49)  0.82 (0.38)  0.56 (0.50) 
Male=1, otherwise 0  0.47 (0.50)  0.52 (0.50)  0.41 (0.49)  0.53 (0.50) 
Area of residence      
North-West=1, otherwise= 0  0.08 (0.27)  0.22 (0.41)  0.05 (0.22)  0.23 (0.42) 
North-East=1, otherwise= 0  0.04 (0.20)  0.17 (0.37)  0.03 (0.16)  0.17 (0.38) 
Centre=1, otherwise= 0  0.11 (0.31)  0.20 (0.40)  0.08 (0.27)  0.21 (0.41) 
South=1, otherwise= 0  0.77 (0.42)  0.41 (0.49)  0.84 (0.36)  0.39 (0.49) 
Academic ability      
Failed high school year=1, otherwise= 0  0.01 (0.10)  0.20 (0.40)  0.01 (0.11)  0.25 (0.43) 
Performance at lower secondary school       
Pass =1, otherwise= 0  0.12 (0.33)  0.27 (0.44)  0.08 (0.28)  0.26 (0.44) 
Good=1, otherwise= 0  0.25 (0.43)  0.30 (0.46)  0.20 (0.40)  0.30 (0.46) 
Very good =1, otherwise= 0  0.27 (0.44)  0.22 (0.42)  0.29 (0.45)  0.21 (0.41) 
Excellent =1, otherwise= 0  0.36 (0.48)  0.21 (0.40)  0.43 (0.50)  0.23 (0.42) 
High school degree classification      
60-69=1, otherwise= 0  0.17 (0.38)  0.32 (0.46)  0.21 (0.41)  0.35 (0.48) 
70-79=1, otherwise= 0  0.22 (0.42)  0.26 (0.440  0.18 (0.38)  0.27 (0.44) 
80-89=1, otherwise= 0  0.18 (0.38)  0.19 (0.39)  0.24 (0.43)  0.18 (0.38) 
90-100=1, otherwise= 0  0.43 (0.49)  0.24 (0.43)  0.37 (0.48)  0.20 (0.40) 
School-related characteristics      
Private high school=1, otherwise= 0  0.08 (0.27)  0.07 (0.25)  0.04 (0.20)  0.04 (0.20) 
Type of high school      
General =1, otherwise= 0  0.58 (0.49)  0.32 (0.47)  0.66 (0.47)  0.33 (0.47) 
Professional=1, otherwise=0  0.07 (0.25)  0.20 (0.40)  0.04 (0.20)  0.18 (0.38) 
Technical=1, otherwise=0  0.29 (0.45)  0.45 (0.50)  0.22 (0.42)  0.46 (0.50) 
Artistic==1, , otherwise=0  0.07 (0.25)  0.04 (0.19)  0.07 (0.26)  0.03 (0.18) 
Family background      
Father’s education      
Primary school or less=1, otherwise=0  0.06 (0.23)  0.13 (0.34)  0.06 (0.23)  0.14 (0.35) 
Lower secondary school=1, otherwise=0  0.21 (0.41)  0.38 (0.49)  0.21 (0.41)  0.39 (0.49) 
High school=1, otherwise=0  0.43 (0.49)  0.39 (0.49)  0.41 (0.49)  0.36 (0.48) 
University=1, otherwise=0  0.31 (0.46)  0.10 (0.30)  0.32 (0.47)  0.11 (0.31) 
Mother’s education      
Primary school or less=1, otherwise=0  0.05 (0.23)  0.14 (0.34)  0.08 (0.27)  0.17 (0.37) 
Lower secondary school=1, otherwise=0  0.22 (0.41)  0.39 (0.49)  0.22 (0.41)  0.40 (0.49) 
High school=1, otherwise=0  0.43 (0.49)  0.39 (0.49)  0.41 (0.49)  0.35 (0.48) 
University=1, otherwise=0  0.30 (0.46)  0.09 (0.28)  0.30 (0.46)  0.09 (0.28) 
Father’s occupation      
High-level=1, otherwise=0  0.36 (0.48)  0.17 (0.38)  0.39 (0.49)  0.20 (0.40) 
Medium-level=1, otherwise=0  0.43 (0.49)  0.39 (0.49)  0.39 (0.49)  0.38 (0.49) 
Low-level=1, otherwise=0  0.18 (0.38)  0.42 (0.49)  0.20 (0.40)  0.39 (0.49) 
Other-unknown=1, otherwise=0  0.03 (0.18)  0.02 (0.15)  0.02 (0.15)  0.03 (0.16) 
Number of observations  783  20,063  591  16,368 
Survey weights have been used  
  22Table 2. Effect of the abolition of military conscription on university enrolment: 
double-difference estimates  
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Constant   0.640*  0.005  1.141*  0.012 
Aged 18 or less when finished 
high school=1, otherwise 0  0.143* 0.020  -0.047**  0.016 
Male=1, otherwise 0  -0.126*  0.007  -0.019*  0.006 
Aged 18 or less when finished 
high school=1, otherwise 0 * 
Male=1, otherwise 0  0.150*  0.029  0.095*  0.023 
Area of residence –Reference category is South 
North-West=1, otherwise= 0      0.027*  0.007 
North-East=1, otherwise= 0      -0.008  0.008 
Centre=1, otherwise= 0      0.003  0.007 




High school degree classification- Reference category is 90-100 
60-69=1, otherwise= 0      -0.250*  0.008 
70-79=1, otherwise= 0      -0.146*  0.008 
80-89=1, otherwise= 0      -0.075*  0.008 
Performance at lower secondary school- Reference category is excellent 
Pass =1, otherwise= 0      -0.126*  0.010 
Good=1, otherwise= 0      -0.039*  0.009 
Very good =1, otherwise= 0      0.015***  0.009 




Type of high school- Reference category is General  
Professional=1, otherwise=0     -0.495*  0.010 
Technical=1, otherwise=0      -0.305*  0.007 
Artistic==1, , otherwise=0      -0.428  0.015 
Father’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      -0.021***  0.011 
Mother’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      -0.003  0.010 
Father’s occupation- Reference category is High-level 
Medium-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.010  0.009 
Low-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.054*  0.009 
Other-unknown=1, otherwise=0      -0.096*  0.019 
R-squared   0.027    0.408   
Number of observations    20,846      20,846   
* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level 









  23Table 3. Effect of the abolition of military conscription on university enrolment: 
double-difference estimates – different university enrolment definition 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Constant   0.671*  0.005  1.132*  0.011 
Aged 18 or less when finished 
high school=1, otherwise 0  0.143* 0.018  -0.032**  0.015 
Male=1, otherwise 0  -0.113*  0.007  -0.018*  0.006 
Aged 18 or less when finished 
high school=1, otherwise 0 * 
Male=1, otherwise 0  0.131*  0.027  0.077*  0.022 
Area of residence –Reference category is South 
North-West=1, otherwise= 0      0.024*  0.007 
North-East=1, otherwise= 0      -0.010  0.008 
Centre=1, otherwise= 0      0.005  0.007 




High school degree classification- Reference category is 90-100 
60-69=1, otherwise= 0      -0.237*  0.008 
70-79=1, otherwise= 0      -0.132*  0.008 
80-89=1, otherwise= 0      -0.068*  0.008 
Performance at lower secondary school- Reference category is excellent 
Pass =1, otherwise= 0      -0.128*  0.010 
Good=1, otherwise= 0      -0.027*  0.009 
Very good =1, otherwise= 0      0.019**  0.008 




Type of high school- Reference category is General  
Professional=1, otherwise=0     -0.463*  0.009 
Technical=1, otherwise=0      -0.277*  0.007 
Artistic==1, , otherwise=0      -0.381*  0.014 
Father’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      -0.023**  0.011 
Mother’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      0.0002  0.010 
Father’s occupation- Reference category is High-level 
Medium-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.006  0.008 
Low-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.049*  0.009 
Other-unknown=1, otherwise=0      -0.073*  0.018 
R-squared   0.023    0.360   
Number of observations  22,859    22,859   
* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level 











  24Table 4 Effect of the abolition of military conscription on university enrolment: 
double-difference estimates – control experiment 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Constant   0.358*  0.104  1.026*  0.016 
Aged 19 when finished high 
school=1, otherwise 0  0.356* 0.012 0.115*  0.011 
Male=1, otherwise 0  -0.078*  0.013  -0.065*  0.011 
Aged 19 when finished high 
school=1, otherwise 0 * Male=1, 
otherwise 0  0.009  0.015  0.069*  0.012 
Area of residence –Reference category is South 
North-West=1, otherwise= 0      0.028*  0.007 
North-East=1, otherwise= 0      -0.007  0.008 
Centre=1, otherwise= 0      -0.002  0.007 




High school degree classification- Reference category is 90-100 
60-69=1, otherwise= 0      -0.249*  0.009 
70-79=1, otherwise= 0      -0.145*  0.008 
80-89=1, otherwise= 0      -0.081*  0.009 
Performance at lower secondary school- Reference category is excellent 
Pass =1, otherwise= 0      -0.110*  0.011 
Good=1, otherwise= 0      -0.041*  0.009 
Very good =1, otherwise= 0      0.010  0.009 




Type of high school- Reference category is General  
Professional=1, otherwise=0     -0.487*  0.010 
Technical=1, otherwise=0      -0.300*  0.007 
Artistic==1, , otherwise=0      -0.411*  0.016 
Father’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      -0.016  0.012 
Mother’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      -0.011  0.011 
Father’s occupation- Reference category is High-level 
Medium-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.010  0.009 
Low-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.051*  0.009 
Other-unknown=1, otherwise=0      -0.084*  0.019 
R-squared   0.122    0.413   
Number of observations  20,063    20,063   
* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level 










  25Table 5. Effect of the abolition of military conscription on university enrolment: 
double-difference estimates – pre-program test 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Constant   0.607*  0.006  1.144*  0.013 
Aged 18 or less when finished 
high school=1, otherwise 0  0.225* 0.021  -0.036**  0.016 
Male=1, otherwise 0  -0.087*  0.008  0.012**  0.006 
Aged 18 or less when finished 
high school=1, otherwise 0 * 
Male=1, otherwise 0  0.062***  0.006  0.054**  0.024 
Area of residence –Reference category is South 
North-West=1, otherwise= 0      -0.011**  0.008 
North-East=1, otherwise= 0      -0.001  0.009 
Centre=1, otherwise= 0      -0.008  0.008 




High school degree classification- Reference category is 90-100 
60-69=1, otherwise= 0      -0.248*  0.009 
70-79=1, otherwise= 0      -0.139*  0.009 
80-89=1, otherwise= 0      -0.051*  0.010 
Performance at lower secondary school- Reference category is excellent 
Pass =1, otherwise= 0      -0.089*  0.011 
Good=1, otherwise= 0      -0.042*  0.010 
Very good =1, otherwise= 0      0.001  0.009 




Type of high school- Reference category is General  
Professional=1, otherwise=0     -0.557*  0.011 
Technical=1, otherwise=0      -0.353*  0.008 
Artistic==1, , otherwise=0      -0.513*  0.017 
Father’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      0.008  0.012 
Mother’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      -0.010  0.011 
Father’s occupation- Reference category is High-level 
Medium-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.026*  0.009 
Low-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.076*  0.010 
Other-unknown=1, otherwise=0      -0.030  0.019 
R-squared   0.023    0.438   
Number of observations  16,959    16,959   
* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level 









  26Table 6– Effect of the abolition of military conscription on university enrolment: 
triple-difference estimates  
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Constant   0.607*  0.005  1.132*  0.009 
Aged 18 or less when finished high 
school=1, otherwise 0  0.225* 0.019  -0.028***  0.015 
Male=1, otherwise 0  -0.087*  0.007  0.009  0.006 
Aged 18 or less when finished high 
school=1, otherwise 0 * Male=1, 
otherwise 0  0.062**  0.030  0.059**  0.023 
Finished high school in 2004=1, 
otherwise 0  0.033* 0.007  0.023*  0.006 
Finished high school in 2004=1, 
otherwise 0 * Male=1, otherwise 0  -0.038* 0.010  -0.025*  0.008 
Finished high school in 2004=1, 
otherwise 0 *Aged 18 or less when 
finished high school=1, otherwise 0  -0.078*  0.029  -0.025  0.022 
Aged 18 or less when finished high 
school=1, otherwise 0 * Male=1, 
otherwise 0 * Finished high school 
in 2004=1, otherwise 0  0.089** 0.043  0.033  0.033 
Area of residence –Reference category is South 
North-West=1, otherwise= 0      0.009  0.005 
North-East=1, otherwise= 0      -0.003  0.006 
Centre=1, otherwise= 0      -0.002  0.005 




High school degree classification- Reference category is 90-100 
60-69=1, otherwise= 0      -0.249*  0.006 
70-79=1, otherwise= 0      -0.142*  0.006 
80-89=1, otherwise= 0      -0.063*  0.006 
Performance at lower secondary school- Reference category is excellent 
Pass =1, otherwise= 0      -0.110*  0.008 
Good=1, otherwise= 0      -0.042*  0.007 
Very good =1, otherwise= 0      0.007  0.006 




Type of high school- Reference category is General  
Professional=1, otherwise=0     -0.524*  0.007 
Technical=1, otherwise=0      -0.329*  0.005 
Artistic==1, , otherwise=0      -0.469*  0.011 
Father’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      -0.006  0.008 
Mother’s education- Reference category is University  








High school=1, otherwise=0      -0.007  0.008 
Father’s occupation- Reference category is High-level 
Medium-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.019*  0.006 
Low-level=1, otherwise=0      -0.065*  0.007 
Other-unknown=1, otherwise=0      -0.063*  0.013 
R-squared   0.025    0.422   
Number of observations  37,805    37,805   
* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level 
Survey weights are used in the regression analysis 
 
  27Table 7– Effect of the abolition of military conscription on university enrolment: 
triple-difference estimates- heterogeneous effects 
  High school graduates whose 
father’s occupation is High-
level or Medium-level 
High school graduates whose father’s 
occupation is Low-level or 
Other/unknown 
 Coefficient    Standard  Error  Coefficient   Standard Error 
Constant   1.096*  0.010  1.267*  0.038 
Aged 18 or less when finished high 
school=1, otherwise 0  -0.004  0.018  -0.081*  0.031 
Male=1, otherwise 0  0.012  0.008  0.006  0.009 
Aged 18 or less when finished high 
school=1, otherwise 0 * Male=1, 
otherwise 0  -0.0004 0.027  0.250*  0.049 
Finished high school in 2004=1, 
otherwise 0  0.012  0.008  0.037*  0.009 
Finished high school in 2004=1, 
otherwise 0 * Male=1, otherwise 0  -0.010 0.011  -0.044*  0.012 
Finished high school in 2004=1, 
otherwise 0 *Aged 18 or less when 
finished high school=1, otherwise 0  -0.038  0.025  0.056  0.046 
Aged 18 or less when finished high 
school=1, otherwise 0 * Male=1, 
otherwise 0 * Finished high school 
in 2004=1, otherwise 0  0.070*** 0.038  -0.144**  0.070 
Area of residence –Reference category is South 
North-West=1, otherwise= 0  0.013***  0.007  0.004  0.008 
North-East=1, otherwise= 0  0.009  0.008  -0.018**  0.009 
Centre=1, otherwise= 0 -0.005  0.007  0.005  0.008 





0.007 -0.077*  0.008 
High school degree classification- Reference category is 90-100 
60-69=1, otherwise= 0  -0.223*  0.008  -0.291*  0.010 
70-79=1, otherwise= 0  -0.112*  0.008  -0.190*  0.010 
80-89=1, otherwise= 0  -0.044*  0.008  -0.098*  0.010 
Performance at lower secondary school- Reference category is excellent 
Pass =1, otherwise= 0  -0.107*  0.010  -0.123*  0.012 
Good=1, otherwise= 0  -0.033*  0.008  -0.065*  0.011 
Very good =1, otherwise= 0  0.019**  0.008  -0.024**  0.010 




Type of high school- Reference category is General  
Professional=1, otherwise=0 -0.512*  0.010  -0.561*  0.011 
Technical=1, otherwise=0  -0.296*  0.007  -0.391*  0.009 
Artistic==1, , otherwise=0 -0.446*  0.015  -0.521*  0.017 
Father’s education- Reference category is University  
Primary school or less=1, 
otherwise=0 
-0.109* 0.014  -0.148*  0.038 
Lower secondary school=1, 
otherwise=0 
-0.076* 0.009  -0.116*  0.037 
High school=1, otherwise=0 -0.024*  0.008 -0.080**  0.037 
Mother’s education- Reference category is University  
Primary school or less=1, 
otherwise=0 
-0.122* 0.013  -0.154*  0.023 
Lower secondary school=1, 
otherwise=0 
-0.072* 0.010  -0.116*  0.022 
High school=1, otherwise=0 -0.009  0.008 -0.047**  0.022 
R-squared   0.403    0.370   
Number of observations  20,207    17,598   
* denotes statistically significant at the 1% level 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level 
Survey weights are used in the regression analysis 
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